A Comparison of Leadership in Controlled Military Democratisation

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Abstract
Military coup d’état displace civilian regimes in the name of cleaning up, but such actions can also challenge the coherence of the military by undermining the recognition of governing institutions. The decision of military regimes to relinquish power from a position of strength and move towards democracy is conditioned by a number of factors, requiring the leader to navigate between the perceived need to maintain political order and military professionalism. This paper considers regime change in Ecuador and Niger as cases of conversion, where elites were able to maintain control in the face of relatively weak organised opposition. The aims of the paper are to (1) determine the factors that can initiate democratisation of military regimes and (2) identify the role of leaders in shaping the process. It is argued that the relative durability of the subsequent regime is determined by the ability of the outgoing military regime to find suitable opposition to maintain order and resist the temptation to return to politics.

Introduction
The seizure of power by the military has a long history and continues to play an important role in shaping politics around the globe. The decision of the military to involve itself in politics derives from a number of different justifications, from cleaning up democratic failings through to protecting or enhancing the military as an institution (Gandhi, 2008). States have sought to manage this threat through actions to ‘coup proof” themselves by focusing on increasing the professionalisation and diversity of the military as a corporate
body (Makara, 2013; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012). The corporate interests of the military contain within them tensions that will generally lead to a decision in time to remove itself from the governance of the state (Brooker, 2000). However, tension between the desires to maintain corporate form while also being wary of reinstating previously ineffective civilian leadership can complicate this withdrawal where the military is in a position of strength and not removed against its will (see Tzortzis, 2016).

When dealing with the clash of interests experienced by the military a strategy of staged or managed democratisation is often seen as a viable means of extraction while ensuring order. This form of controlled democratisation has been an important form of transition involving military regimes, as it ensures that the institution is protected from immediate repercussions and also ensures some degree of stability. In Portugal in 1974 a coup d’état was staged by junior officers to remove an authoritarian regime in order to end damaging foreign wars and reassert a corporate identity (Bermeo, 2007, see also Accornero, 2013; Olivas Osuna, 2014). By contrast, the contemporary move towards democratisation in Myanmar has been closely managed and controlled by an entrenched military elite seeking to maintain some degree of direct control after regime change (Bünte, 2014; Croissant and Kamerling, 2013). The decision of the military elite to move towards democracy does not come without potential costs, even where the process can be controlled in the short to medium term. The threat of potential repercussions therefore raises the issue of what leads to a military regime to take the decision to democratise and who determines this.

To assess the motivation and form of the decision to move from military regime to democracy this paper examines regime changes in Ecuador (1979) and Niger (1992). These two countries underwent a process of democratisation in which the military sought to maintain some degree of control over the shape of the emerging political system that developed (see Guo and Stradiotto, 2014). The military regimes concerned were both in power for at least a decade and had developed forms of institutional control over the political system that provided them with a sufficiently stable base from which to oversee the transition towards democracy. The underlying pressures the regimes faced was slightly different, but in both cases the most effective means of dealing with these pressures was seen to involve the extraction of the military from power. Comparing the respective decision to relinquish power
and the subsequent trajectories can generate insights about the factors that motivate such actions when acting from a position of relative strength.

The hierarchical character of the military regime form means that the wishes of the leader will feature strongly in any decision, even where pressure for change is emerging within the regime and society more generally. This paper considers the actions of the military leaders in Ecuador and Niger in initiating and managing the transition process to determine how these actions shaped the trajectory of change. Drawing on the analysis the paper aims to (1) determine the factors that initiated democratisation of the regimes and (2) identify the role of the leader in shaping the process. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section the literature on military regimes is examined, outlining the core institutional factors and issues of durability in the face of pressures for change. The second section builds on this framework by outlining the characteristics of political leadership in democratic and non-democratic regimes. Section three introduces the two cases, outlining the character of the regime, the transition and the actions of the incumbent leader. Finally, the paper draws out the key features from the cases and considers these in light of the literatures on military regimes and political leadership to draw conclusions about the character of controlled democratisations from military regimes.

**Military Regimes and Democratisation**

Military regimes have proliferated throughout history and have distinct characteristics that mark them out as unique. Considering the non-democratic form, Gandhi (2008:7) argues that the common characteristic is the achievement of ‘power by means other than competitive elections.’ The military’s decision to seize power is often justified on the basis of failure by the current regime, with the military taking on the role of restoring order (Feaver, 1999; Sundhaussen, 1998). This initial goal that leads to the military seizing power suggests that they will be ready to hand over power once stability has been achieved and return to the barracks. While it is the case that Military regimes tend to be shorter in duration (compared to personalist and party types) this does not necessarily ensure stability, as the armed forces may come to see involvement in politics as a viable option. In order to understand the willingness and ability of a military regime to democratise it is necessary to consider the regime type and the possible pathways to democracy.
The motivations of the military as an institution are central in determining the decision to engage in politics. Huntington (1964) referred to the concept of military professionalism to encapsulate the interests of the military as a corporate entity specialising in the management of violence to protect the state from external threats.\(^1\) This external focus means that the military as an institution is apolitical (or above politics) and does not concern itself with the running of the state. Drawing on developments in Latin America to challenge this position, Stepan (1973; 1978) argued that where the domestic environment is perceived to be unstable, a new form of military professionalism could emerge. Central to this progression is the education of military forces in broader issues of domestic governance and economics (Stepan, 1973). More recently, Gandhi (2008: 28-9) has argued that:

Unforeseen by the civilian elites who advocated military professionalization, however, was that the creation of an autonomous military above civilian parties provided it with the means to intervene in its own politics.

The risk of military professionalisation in this sense is that it can develop a corporate identity that is at odds with its role as provider of security of the state and see its interests more directly tied to the governance of that state.

Once the military has seized power, three key forms have been identified: ruler, guardian and moderator (see Table 1) (Nordlinger, 1977). Brooker (2000: 48) notes that these types are determined by ‘a combination of two variables: (a) the extent of a regime’s political/economic objectives and goals, and (b) the extent of government power wielded by the military.’ The ruler type rates highly on both measures, as the regime has the power and desire to maintain control of the regime and is less inclined to relinquish power until the goal has been achieved. This position is more in line with the adoption of new military professionalism, as the range of objectives and goals increases, aligning the military more closely with the role of government. Guardian and moderator types, by contrast, have less

\(^1\) Friesendorf (2011) identifies the challenge posed by the police in turn adopting more militarised roles.
interest in achieving specific goals and more in maintaining order and stability, making them less durable in the longer-term.

Table 1 – Levels of Military Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moderators</th>
<th>Guardians</th>
<th>Rulers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent of Power</td>
<td>Veto power</td>
<td>Governmental control</td>
<td>Regime dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and</td>
<td>Preserve status</td>
<td>Preserve status quo and/or correct</td>
<td>Effect political change and sometimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Objectives</td>
<td>quo</td>
<td>malpractices and deficiencies</td>
<td>socioeconomic change</td>
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The specific characteristics of the military regime under consideration will do much to determine how it operates. In determining the extent of power the regime has it is necessary to consider the form of the corporate body and the shape of the governing elite. Gandhi (2008: 75) notes that the core of the issue facing such regimes whereby ‘military dictators must neutralize the threats posed by their closest colleagues and harness their cooperation to govern.’ In the absence of democratic practices the regime is forced to rely on exertion of control and reliance on corporate identity. Frantz and Stein (2012: 298) argue that in this regard:

Military leaders typically govern the country in a hierarchical manner similar to how they manage the military itself. The governing junta generally respects long-standing internal rules and protocols of the military and also adheres to military guidelines for determining promotions.

This reliance on and respect for formalised structures provides some degree of certainty in the organisation of the regime and those seeking to understand its practices, reducing internal conflicts and redressing the instability military regimes claim to address.

Where the military hierarchy is undermined by corruption or excessive patronage the ability of the ruling elite to maintain internal cohesion will be reduced. The 1974 coup d’état in Portugal is identified as a classic example, as junior officers rebelled over the costs of continued involvement in colonial wars (Bermeo, 2007). The loss of corporate identity can lead to degradation of the regime into personalist rule. The character of the military regime has important implications for processes of democratisation. Personalist regimes are more difficult to dislodge, as the costs are higher for those involved, as there is a closer and more
direct identification with the non-democratic regime (Brooker, 2000). At the other end of the spectrum, Linz and Stepan (1996: 66-7) argue that:

All hierarchical military regimes share one characteristic that is potentially favorable to democratic transition. The officer corps, taken as a whole, sees itself as a permanent part of the state apparatus, with enduring interests and permanent functions that transcend the interests of the government of the day.

In democratic transitions involving military regimes the corporate nature of the underlying institution means that such regimes, personalised or hierarchical, will seek to dictate and control the process. Their ability to do so will be determined by the extent of their power (Table 1) and the ability to manage opposition from within society.

The decision to democratise can be driven by pressure from below or it can be dictated and managed from above (see della Porta, 2013; Guo and Stradiotto, 2014). In some cases, democratisation may emerge as a by-product of attempts by the regime to deal with other internal problems (Rustow, 1970). Concerning military regimes, those in power primarily drive democratisation and in the absence of regime collapse or overthrow the military as an institution is able to ‘negotiate their withdrawal on terms where they retain nondemocratic prerogatives or impose very confining conditions’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 67). Where the governing regime has a high degree of power these controls can be more extensive, potentially limiting the pace or even likelihood of full democracy emerging. Acting as ruler or guardian type, the military will seek to ensure order and stability continues following its withdrawal from power. Alternately, the military elites may seek to maintain control by shedding the uniform while remaining in power, through democratic or non-democratic means (Gandhi, 2008).

Democratisation is a process entailing significant uncertainty, leading in the case of military regimes to attempts to ensure continued influence to ensure stability. Within the process of democratisation three broad stages have been identified, involving liberalisation of non-democratic rule, regime transition, and consolidation of a new political order (see Linz and Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Shin, 1994). Initiation of the process does not preclude freezing in a semi-democratic form or even reversion (see McFaul, 2002; Bogaards, 2009) and initial openings may soon be closed in the face of uncertainty (see for example Deng, 2011). The cases considered in this paper all engaged in some degree of liberalisation.
and then attempt to manage the transition from military rule. However, their experiences diverged following the regime change. In order to understand the respective trajectories it is necessary to consider the decisions taken by the ruling elites in each country and how these were shaped by their domestic context.

Leadership in Non-Democratic and Democratising Regimes

The role of the leader in a military regime is determined by the institutional structure, whereas the factors governing leaders in democratising regimes are more fluid. While this may provide some certainty for the military regime, the base on which their position is grounded may be less stable than at first appears. Discussing this point, Cronin (1993: 13 emphasis in original) pointed to the distinction between power and authority where the former refers to ‘strength or raw force to coerce or force someone to do something, while authority is the power that is accepted as legitimate by subordinates.’ This central distinction defines the limits to how a non-democratic regime can exercise control and points to the potential inherent weakness that such leaders face. The lack of accurate mechanisms for recognising and acting on positive and negative feedback limits opportunities for incremental adjustments to ensure continued stability and release of internal pressure (see Weaver, 2010). In the absence of these mechanisms for gauging the degree of acceptance of their rule by subordinates and within society military leaders can become increasingly isolated and reliant on the direct exercise of power to maintain control.

As noted above the intervention of a military regime will be justified on a number of bases, but a common claim is the need to ensure effective governance following the failure of civilian regimes. This overall justification also disguises the fact that ‘the military has its own institutional or corporatist interests that include the establishment of autonomy and the amassment of resources.’ (Gandhi, 2008: 28-9) Although the regime may be governed in the name of the military and in the interests of the state, decision-making power will be located within a small group (junta) or concentrated in the hands of an individual leader. This makes it necessary to consider the constraints that leaders face in governing. Considering broader forms of leadership, Burns (1978: 433) identified ‘motivation, value and purpose’ as being central to understanding the actions taken by leaders. In the case of the military regime it is crucial to determine whether the view of the leader or junta on these factors align with those
of the wider corporate body. Where there is alignment, the leader will be more able to exercise control and ensure the loyalty and support of the institution, something that will not be possible in cases where the leader is out of alignment with the corporate interest.

Structural factors shape the decisions individual leaders as actors within the system are able to make. A military leader relies on hierarchical structures, so the leader governs by right of their position. Moving towards democratisation introduces uncertainty that may threaten other actors within the hierarchy, while also empowering those outside. Such an approach requires the leader to achieve a balance ‘as leaders must be willing and able to run the risk of mobilising their own constituency and the risk of accepting compromises’ (Pasquino, 1990: 126). In the case of military regimes, the leader must balance the corporate needs of the military with those of the contending forces within society. As Tzortzis (2016) has recently argued with regard to democratisation in Greece and Spain, that the actions and decisions of the leaders were crucial in the respective failure and success of controlled democratisation. In both cases leaders were required to counter factions within the military while at the same time attempting satisfy demands and expectations from emerging opposition parties.

Taken together, these factors suggest that military regimes that have the capacity to do so will seek to control the democratisation process as a means of ensuring stability. Although there may be a move towards democratisation this may not be the initial motivation, meaning that there is an inherent tension given the desire for stability noted above. In this process the actions of the leader will be central in determining whether the democratisation is sustainable and maintained. Returning to issues of continuity, the persistence of a leader from the outgoing regime can contribute to stability and enable decisions to be based on longer-term considerations (see O’Brien, 2007; 2010; 2016). Hite and Morlino (2004) argue that values, institutions and behaviours from the non-democratic period will continue to cast a shadow over the democratising system. These legacies may be enhanced where a non-democratic leader continues to govern the political regime. In the case of military regimes it is important to consider the unity and support of the armed forces in accepting the new order, which may be undermined where civilian leaders are appointed or where military leaders take actions that appear to threaten the interests of the military as a corporate body. As Tzortzis (2016) has
noted, even the paradigmatic Spanish transition saw military threat for several years after the regime change was initiated, embodied in the failed 1981 coup (see also Olivas Osuna, 2014).

**Military Governance in Ecuador and Niger**

The military regimes in Ecuador and Niger shared a number of similarities, although they emerged in different contexts. In both cases strong leaders emerged and took control of the regime, subduing the role of the military in governing to their own personal will. Actions taken to centralise power in this way lay at the core of the eventual decision to relinquish power and return to civilian rule. The cases have been selected due to their classification as cases of controlled democratisation (or conversion as identified by Guo and Stradiotto, 2014). This form of regime change sees the military maintain a degree of control over the transition to civilian governance, often for a period of time following the official withdrawal. It is important to consider the role of the leadership of such regimes in order to understand the reasons why they would be willing to transfer power in this way.

On February 15 1972, General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara initiated a coup in Ecuador to remove the incumbent civilian regime. The reasons given for the intervention place the new regime clearly in the ruler category as Rodríguez Lara stated 'There would be no temporary interventions just in order to turn power over to the same old politicians, the same old parties... This time it would be to totally transform the entire country.' (cited in Schodt, 1987: 88-9) The ambition was to undertake reforms that broke the dominance of the agrarian elite and capitalise on oil revenues in order to promote domestic development. In contrast to the 1963-66 military junta, which had acted to forestall a communist threat, the Rodríguez Lara regime justified its intervention on the need for deeper structural reforms that could address the failings of the civilian regime that had preceeded it (Isaacs, 1993).

In Niger, the military entered politics on April 15 1974 following civil unrest and the failure of the government to ensure stability. The regime was led by the the *Conseil Militaire Suprême* (CMS) 'a shadowy group of twelve military officers led by Lt. Col Senyi Kountché' (Charlick, 1991: 62). Although the regime did not express the same far-reaching goals as that of the Ecuadorian regime, the extent of the famine and political discontent provided an opportunity for a similar level of engagement in politics (Moestrup, 1999). Kountché moved
quickly to establish control and position himself as ruler, a position he held with little direct challenge until his death in 1987. Following his death Ali Saibou was appointed interim president and was able to consolidate this position and hold it until 1993 when the first free presidential elections were held (see Robinson, 1994).

Having gained power both Rodríguez Lara and Kountché (continued by Saibou) established personalist styles of rule, sidelining and controlling the military as an institution. Rodríguez Lara gained control at the expense of the Consejo Supremo de Gobierno (CSG) within six months of gaining power (Isaacs, 1993). Establishment of a personalist form of rule contributed to factionalisation within the military and came increasingly under fire from excluded political leaders, the private sector and labour organisations (Schoedt, 1987). In Niger, Kountché was more successful in establishing a stable personalist base 'balancing the interests of the military and, to a lesser extent, those of the civilian bureaucracy with his own interest in maintaining centralized, tight, highly personal control.' (Charlick, 1987: 64) Both leaders also used repression to address and stifle dissent (see Charlick, 1987; Isaacs, 1993). Saibou followed Kountché's lead, while also reducing the degree of repression and seeking to encourage mass mobilisation to show support for the regime (Charlick, 1987).

Personalisation of the regimes can be seen as a symptom of low levels of military professionalism, as the leaders were able to circumvent corporate structures to pursue their personal interests. Isaacs (1993: 102) argues that in the case of Ecuador the 'absence of advanced training...prevented the emergence of a coherent set of corporate values.' While this lack of corporateness enabled the leaders to control the military, it also introduced an element of uncertainty, as hierarchical roles were disattended. In Niger under Kountché, Charlick (1987) notes that attempted coups took place every couple of years. Both countries had established institutional bodies to govern (CSG and CMS) but these were sidelined in favour of the interests of the leader. Failure to cultivate military professionalism also undermined the ability to rely on the loyalty of the institution, as Rodríguez Lara discovered when he was overthrown by coup in 1976.

The performance of the regimes in the two countries followed broadly similar overall trajectories. The discovery of oil in Ecuador in 1967 and uranium in Niger enabled both to
initially generate legitimacy in the eyes of the population by increasing public spending and reducing the level of political instability. In Ecuador the regime used oil resources to promote land reform and modernise the economy (Avilés. 2009). Despite the opportunity presented by oil, the minimal levels of foreign participation in the industry from 1974 meant that exports collapsed and the regime was forced to find other ways to encourage production in the face of growing economic and social instability (Brogan, 1984). Niger also relied on resource exploitation, with public spending rising by 185% between 1976 and 1980, at which point uranium represented 75% of state revenues (Gazibo, 2995: 75). Following global recession and collapse in uranium prices the regime was forced to turn to the IMF, leading to growing discontent within the population, which peaked in 1989 (Gazibo, 2005). The inability of both regimes to live up to the promises they had made on seizing power sowed the seeds for their eventual decision to relinquish power.

The ways in which the regimes initiated the process of democratisation varied, but arguably derived from their perceived failings. Rodríguez Lara was removed by a coup that brought together hardliners and softliners and quickly renounced the reformist agenda with the stated intention of returning power to civilians (Schodt, 1987). An important motivation was identified as Rodríguez Lara's actions to concentrate power in his hands, at the expense of the military as an institution (Isaacs, 1993). In Niger, Saibou moved to reform the political system by creating a new national party in 1988 and holding elections for a National Assembly the following year (Charlick, 1991). Charlick (1991: 76) argues that rather than demonstrating a commitment to democratisation, these moves reflected a consistent pattern in Nigerien politics which involved a 'struggle to build a strong bureaucratic-authoritarian state apparatus, the failure to achieve this goal and the ascendency of personal rule, the realization of the limits of personal rule and subsequent efforts to supplement it through populist mobilization.'

The result in both cases was an attempt to move towards some form of civilian rule, under the tutelage of the outgoing regime. The Ecuadorian regime was shaken by the victory of a centre-left ticket in the first round of the presidential elections, leading to 'political tension orchestrated by conservatives' and a failed attempt by right-wing officers to topple the junta in September 1978 (Brogan, 1984: 18). As Isaacs (1993) notes, attempts by the military
regime failed as the *retorno* escaped its control. Ali Saibou also attempted to maintain control. While a constitutional referendum in September 1989 officially ended military rule, Robinson (1994: 598) notes that it also 'created a presidential regime, institutionalized a political role for the military, [and] established the *Mouvement National pour la Societe de Development* (MNSD) as the sole legal party'. Faced with the continuation of rebranded authoritarian rule, trade unions and students engaged in sustained opposition, eventually forcing Saibou to agree to a national conference in July 1991 to negotiate terms of transition to multipartism (Robinson, 1994). The outcome was a transitional government that drafted a new constitution 'introducing a semi-presidential regime, on 26 December 1992. Elections for the national assembly and two rounds of presidential elections followed in February and March 1993’ (Moestrup, 1999: 178-9) bringing an end to the regime.

**Democratisation of Ruler Type Military Regimes**

The military regimes in Ecuador and Niger both clearly align with Nordlinger's ruler-type regime. They faced little direct opposition to their rule and were able to act with relative impunity on coming to power. The leadership of these regimes sought to bring about sweeping changes to what they perceived to be dysfunctional political systems by introducing social and economic reforms (including those governing land tenure). Despite their apparent strength and desire to remain in power the leaders involved were eventually forced to relinquish power due to growing external demands and internal divisions. Although it has been argued that military regimes remain in power for shorter periods of time (Brooker, 2000), these two cases reinforce the point that this is not necessarily by choice.

The first point to note about the regimes is that the leaders that sought to maintain control (Rodríguez Lara, Kountché and Saibou) did so by centralising and personalising power in their hands (see Gandhi, 2008). This clashes with the general trend of military regimes to govern through established guidelines (Frantz and Stein, 2012). Lower levels of professionalisation in both cases meant that the internal hierarchy of the military as a corporate body was easier to bypass. The coup against Rodríguez Lara can be seen as an attempt by the military to reassert the control as an institution, whereas Saibou's attempted to pre-empt this threat by removing the military from a governing position. The decision of the leaders to move undermine the military hierarchy and corporate practices weakened their
base left them exposed.\(^2\) It also meant that the military suffered reputational damage following the democratisation, with the resulting degree of control in the post-authoritarian period being less than had been anticipated.

The ability of leaders to remain in power was also linked to the performance of the regime. As Brooker (2000) has argued, the lack of accountability to the public means that authoritarian regimes must find another base from which to generate legitimacy (see also Frantz and Stein, 2012). Both regimes were able to draw on natural resources to generate income for the state, but as external conditions changed and prices fell they had limited options. Turning to external lenders (such as the IMF) further weakened the legitimacy they did have and led to a reliance on repressive measures to quell discontent. Ali Saibou was able to temporarily forestall opposition by reducing levels of repression, as was the junta that dislodged Rodríguez Lara. In both cases this proved short-lived, as limited steps towards liberalisation were not sufficient to address the demands of the external opposition.

Table 2 – Regime Type and Mode of Transition (1975-1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Conversion</th>
<th>Cooperative</th>
<th>Collapse</th>
<th>Foreign Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *‘Party’ includes ‘One Party’ and ‘Electoral’; +‘Communist’ excludes former Soviet Republics, FYR and Slovakia

Source: Guo and Stradiotto (2014) and Kailitz (2013)

Examining both cases and their moves towards democracy it is clear that the classification of controlled democratisation (or conversion) is appropriate. Neither of the regimes democratised willingly, instead being forced to change due to growing pressure from below and internal tensions. The desire to maintain control during the democratisation process can be linked to the attempt to protect the military from retribution and also to guard against problems identified in previous civilian regimes (see Linz and Stepan, 1996). As Guo and

\(^2\) The actions of President Boris Yeltsin to neglect the formal institutions of government in favour of an informal led to a similar exposure and inability to rely on formal authority (see O’Brien, 2007).
Stradiotto (2014) note (Table 2) military regimes are reluctant to relinquish power through negotiation between equal parties and instead are more likely to hold out and face collapse if they are unable to exercise some degree of control.

Conclusion

The threat and reality of military intervention in politics has been observed throughout history, following peaks and troughs. A central driver has often been the failure of civilian governance and the perceived need to clean up. Acting as a corporate body, the military possess the tools and capability to dislodge civilian regimes. However, the costs of doing so are often high, as the military suffers internal divisions and reputational damage. As Linz and Stepan (1996) note, the military remains part of the apparatus of the state, so must keep an eye to its future viability. Within these regimes, the role of the leader is key in determining the form of governance that emerges. Ruler-type military regimes require significant institutional order and capacity to sustain themselves in power, as well as support or quiescence of the population, something that is likely to decrease over time if formal hierarchies are disattended in favour of informal relations.

The two cases examined in this paper illustrate the costs for the military of engaging in politics. They also demonstrate the result of less professionalised institutions seizing power. More personalised forms of rule in Ecuador and Niger resulted in a breakdown of order within the military as an institution, as demonstrated by the coup attempts staged against Kountché and Rodríguez Lara. Both cases also illustrate the difficulty in maintaining a ruler-type regime when military order and structure are subverted in the interests of the leader. Democratisation came as a result of building external pressure during periods of liberalisation. These actions were undertaken in an attempt to re-establish the legitimacy of the regime among the general population, in an attempt to move to civilian one-party rule in Niger and a form of managed return to tutelary civilian governance under the Ecuadorian junta. However, having moved away from the corporate ideals of the military, the outgoing regimes struggled to impose control over the form and nature of the regime that succeeded them.
References:


